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Abstract
In debates concerning the consequence argument, it has long been
claimed that McKay and Johnson (1996) demonstrated the invalidity of
rule (β). Here, I argue that their result is not as robust as we might
like to think. First, I argue that McKay and Johnson’s counterexample
is successful if one adopts a certain interpretation of “no choice about”
and if one is willing to deny the conditional excluded middle principle. In
order to make this point I demonstrate that (β) is valid on Stalnaker’s
theory of counterfactuals. This result is important and should not be
neglected, I argue, because there is a particular line of objection to the
revised formulations of the consequence argument that does not succeed
against the original version.
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1 Introduction
Is determinism compatible with free will? If the consequence argument is sound,
the answer is “no”. van Inwagen’s formulation (1983: 56) runs as follows:
If determinism is true, then events about our actions are the consequence
of a proposition L stating the laws of nature together with a proposition
P0 about the distant past.
1 But we have no choice about whether L is
true. And we have no choice about whether P0 is true. Hence, we have
no choice about the consequences of those things, including our actions.
The key of the argument is the assumption that “no-choice about” transfers
across conditionals: if P is true and no one has any choice about whether P is
true, and P ⊃ Q is true and no one has any choice about whether P ⊃ Q is
true, then Q is true and no one has any choice about whether Q is true. This is
what the (in)famous rule (β) says in the following standard modal formulation.
Let NP stand for “P and no one has or ever had any choice about whether P
is true” (van Inwagen 1983: 93-95). Here is the modal version:
(α) □φ ⊢ Nφ
(β) Nφ, N(φ ⊃ ψ) ⊢ Nψ
1 □((L ∧ P0) ⊃ P ) determinism
2 □(L ⊃ (P0 ⊃ P )) modal logic, 1
3 N(L ⊃ (P0 ⊃ P )) α, 2
4 NL premise
5 NP0 premise
6 N(P0 ⊃ P ) β, 3, 4
7 NP β, 5, 6
1As we now know, P0 needs to be a proposition about the distant past (Campbell 2007).
I am grateful to an anonymous referee for drawing my attention to this.
2
Although there is still a great deal of debate over the consequence argument,
the modal formulation above is too problematic. Orthodoxy tells us that (β) is
invalid.
[...] even though Beta seems intuitively valid, Beta turned out to be
invalid. In a paper published in 1996, McKay and Johnson demonstrated
the invalidity of Beta in two steps. (Vihvelin 2013: 160)
Rule (β) does seem valid because N is some sort of unavoidability operator,
and one might expect it to be something pretty similar to the box of logical
necessity. “No-choice about” should transfer across material conditionals just
like the box does (if it’s necessary that P and necessary that P ⊃ Q, then
it’s necessary that Q). However, McKay and Johnson are credited to have
demonstrated that rule (β) is invalid (see Huemer 2000; van Inwagen 2000;
Vihvelin 2017).2 So, contrary to appearances, (β) is not like the box.
Yet my claim in this paper is that McKay and Johnson’s result is not ro-
bust enough: What they demonstrated is that rule (β) is invalid if we make
certain assumptions about counterfactuals and assume a certain interpretation
of “no-choice about” (namely, the counterfactual sufficiency interpretation), as
I shall present it in section 2. Moreover, I argue in section 3 that things are
different if one adopts a Stalnakerian view of counterfactuals. Given the same
interpretation of “no-choice about” where (β) fails (for example, on Lewis’ view),
I demonstrate that (β) is valid on Stalnaker’s view. What is at stake here, I
shall argue, is the conditional excluded middle.
In section 4 I discuss the relevance of this result in a more general context
concerning the cogency of the consequence argument. Since (β) is taken to be
invalid, most incompatibilists adopt a revised definition of “no choice about”
that makes some (β)-like principle valid, which is so regardless of controversial
2Perhaps the only exception is Blum (2000). Even so, he argues for the paradoxical con-
clusion that “N ought to be, and yet ought to fail to be, agglomerative” (Blum 2000: 286).
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assumptions about counterfactuals. However, while this move has its merits,
we will see that it also makes the consequence argument more vulnerable to
objections that did not affect the original version. I shall argue that there is a
particularly threatening objection to the updated consequence arguments that
leaves the original formulation unscathed. In other words, the fact that rule (β)
is valid on Stalnaker’s theory of counterfactuals should not be neglected.
2 McKay and Johnson’s counterexample to (β)
McKay and Johnson’s counterexample to (β) has indeed two steps. The first
one is a counterexample to agglomeration:
(Agglomeration) Nφ,Nψ ⊢ N(φ ∧ ψ)
The second one is a demonstration that agglomeration follows from rules (α)
and (β). Since (α) is indisputable, they conclude (β) is invalid.
First, a preliminary definition. The definition I am going to present is pro-
vided by Pruss (2013) in order to capture formally the more intuitive notion of
“no-choice-about”(see also Huemer 2000, Carlson 2000).
Definition 2.1. Nφ if and only if φ∧∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α)∧(Does(x, α) ∼φ)]
In the definition above, is the subjunctive conditional or counterfactual,
x is a variable ranging over humans, α is a variable ranging over all possible
action types in the past, present, and future (cf. Pruss (2013: 433)), while
Can(x, α) and Does(x, α) are left unanalysed.
The intended interpretation is supposed to capture the idea that Nφ is in-
compatible with any humans having free will. Let P be any true proposition
about human action. If no one can do anything such that, if one were to do it,
∼P would be the case, then there’s no free will.
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Though Can(x, α) is left unanalysed, the proofs I will present work given just
some fairly plausible assumption about it. With respect to, just to refresh
the reader’s memory, I shall start by saying something about the meaning of
counterfactuals that amounts to the common aspects of Lewis and Stalnaker
approaches:
(LS) φ ψ is true in a world w if and only if ψ is true in all the worlds in
which φ is true that are closest to w.
I also adopt the standard terminology in saying that an φ-world is just a
world in which φ is true. In this sense to say that φ ψ is true in w is to say
that ψ is true in all the φ-worlds closest to w.
Now the counterexample. Imagine a situation in which we have a fair coin,
and suppose that the coin is not tossed, though surely someone could have tossed
it. Let P stand for the proposition expressed by the sentence “the coin does not
land heads" and Q for "the coin does not land tails”. The counterexample goes
as follows. No one has (or ever had) any choice about whether P is true, and
the same goes for Q. But someone does have a choice about whether P ∧Q is
true.
According to our interpretation, to say that no one has (or ever had) any
choice about whether P is true is to say that P is true and there’s no agent x,
action-type α such that, if x were to do α, ∼P would be the case. P is true
in that scenario because the coin is not tossed, so that the coin does not land
heads. (And the same goes for Q). But what about the counterfactual? Is
there an action that an agent can perform such that, if she were to perform it,
the coin would land heads? We’re assuming in the scenario that someone could
have tossed the coin. So, the main point is whether at least one of the following
counterfactuals is true:
C1: If someone were to toss the coin, it would land heads.
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C2: If someone were to toss the coin, it would land tails.
If both C1 and C2 are false, then the premises of agglomeration are true.
The conclusion is false because you can toss the coin, for example. And if you
were to do it, the coin would land either heads or tails, so that P ∧Q would be
false. Now, are C1 and C2 really false?
Many people think that they are false. To illustrate this, we can have a
look at a Lewisian account of counterfactuals, which counts C1 and C2 as false.
According to such a view, in order for either counterfactual to be true, either
all of the closest worlds to ours where the coin is tossed are heads-worlds or all
of them are tails-worlds. For example, if C1 is true, then there must be some
factor that influences the similarity relation so that heads-worlds are closer to
our world than tails-worlds. But it seems that there is nothing that would grant
some special priority to heads-worlds over tails-worlds (or vice versa). Some of
such worlds are heads-worlds, while others are tails-worlds...
We are assuming in the scenario that it cannot be the case that the coin lands
heads and tails. In this sense, we can think of the disjunction “either C1 or C2”
as an instance of the conditional excluded middle principle: (P  Q)∨ (P 
∼Q). As we all know, the principle fails on Lewis’ view. The principle fails
because Q might be true in some (but not all) of the closest worlds where P is
true and ∼Q might be true in some (but not all) of the closest possible worlds
where P is true. In this case, both P  Q and P  ∼Q are false.
What’s true on Lewis’ account is the corresponding “might-counterfactual”,
that is, "if φ were the case, ψ might be the case". Let◇→ stand for if... might....
Now define ◇→ thus:
(Duality): φ◇→ ψ if and only if ∼(φ ∼ψ)
What is true on Lewis’ view is that, if someone were to toss the coin, it might
land heads; and if someone were to toss the coin, it might land tails. But this
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means that, given the definition of the might-counterfactual, C1 and C2 are false.
And if they are false, the premises of McKay and Johnson’s counterexample are
true.
That was the first step of the counterexample. The second step is simpler,
and it can be spelled out as follows:
1 NP premise
2 NQ premise
3 □(P ⊃ (Q ⊃ (P ∧Q))) Logical truth
4 N(P ⊃ (Q ⊃ (P ∧Q))) α, 3
5 N(Q ⊃ (P ∧Q)) β, 1, 4
6 N(P ∧Q) β, 2, 5
As we already saw, the premises are true. Rule (α) is valid. But the conclu-
sion is false. Therefore, in the reasoning above, what allowed us getting a false
conclusion from true premises was precisely rule (β). Therefore, (β) is invalid.
I think the counterexample is perfectly convincing if we assume a Lewisian
theory of counterfactuals. I say “Lewisian” because the first step of the coun-
terexample need not be backed by Lewis’ own account of counterfactuals, but
merely by the claim that C1 and C2 are both false, and consequently by the de-
nial of the conditional excluded middle principle. If, on the other hand, we were
to accept the principle, then the first step would not get off the ground. In order
to illustrate this, I will show how things are different if we accept Stalnaker’s
view, one that accepts the conditional excluded middle principle.
3 Stalnaker’s view and the limit assumption
Contrary to Lewis, Stalnaker thinks that there is never more than one closest
φ-world. This is the limit assumption. Accepting the limit assumption has
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important consequences on the exact formulation of truth conditions for coun-
terfactuals as well as on the deductive rules for the logic of counterfactuals.
Here I will mention two of them. They will allow us to demonstrate that both
agglomeration and (β) hold on Stalnaker’s view. Here’s the first one (see also
Bonevac 2003: 418).
(S) ∼(φ ψ) ⊢ φ ∼ψ
It’s easy to see that (S) holds on Stalnaker’s theory. It follows from what
has been said about the meaning of counterfactuals (namely, LS) and the limit
assumption, that there is never more than one closest φ-world. (On Lewis’
view, on the other hand, (S) doesn’t hold. What follows from ∼(φ ψ) is the
might-counterfactual φ◇→ ∼ψ).
(S) goes in only one direction, so that ∼(φ  ψ) does not follow from
φ ∼ψ, since φ ∼ψ and φ ψ hold in case φ is impossible. But it does
follow if we suppose that ◇φ.
(S-2) ◇φ, φ ∼ψ ⊢ ∼(φ ψ)
To show that agglomeration holds we also need the assumption that if some-
one can perform some α, then it is possible she performs α: in other words, I
shall assume that Can(x, α) entails◇Does(x, α). This assumption isn’t wholly
unproblematic nowadays because Spencer (2017) has recently provided a bat-
tery of cases against this principle. But I don’t think that this is really relevant
for this discussion. The reason is that what motivates the assumption is rule
(α) (which, by the way, is invalid if Spencer is right). However, a crucial as-
pect of McKay and Johnson’s argument is that (α) is valid, as it is explicit in
the second step. So if the assumption doesn’t work, neither does McKay and
Johnson’s counterexample to the original rule (β).




3 ∼N(φ ∧ ψ)
4 φ ∧ ∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α) ∧ (Does(x, α) ∼φ)] def. N, 1
5 ψ ∧ ∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α) ∧ (Does(x, α) ∼ψ)] def. N, 2
6 ∼[(φ ∧ ψ) ∧ ∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α) ∧ (Does(x, α) ∼(φ ∧ ψ)] def. N, 3
7 ∼(φ ∧ ψ) ∨ ∃x∃α[Can(x, α) ∧ (Does(x, α) ∼(φ ∧ ψ))] Taut con, 6
8 φ ∧E, 4
9 ψ ∧E, 5
10 φ ∧ ψ ∧I, 8, 9
11 ∃x∃α[Can(x, α) ∧ (Does(x, α) ∼(φ ∧ ψ))] Taut con, 7, 10
12 Can(s, a) ∧ (Does(s, a) ∼(φ ∧ ψ)) ∃E, 11
13 ∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α) ∧ (Does(x, α) ∼φ)] ∧E, 4
14 ∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α) ∧ (Does(x, α) ∼ψ)] ∧E, 5
15 ∼Can(s, a) ∨ ∼(Does(s, a) ∼φ) Taut con, 13
16 ∼Can(s, a) ∨ ∼(Does(s, a) ∼ψ) Taut con, 14
17 Can(s, a) ∧E, 12
18 ∼(Does(s, a) ∼φ) DS, 15, 17
19 ∼(Does(s, a) ∼ψ) DS, 16, 17
20 Does(s, a) φ S, 18
21 Does(s, a) ψ S, 19
22 Does(s, a) ∼(φ ∧ ψ) ∧E, 12
23 Does(s, a) (φ ∧ ψ) Taut con, 20, 21
24 ◇Does(s, a) Can, 17
25 ∼(Does(s, a) (φ ∧ ψ)) S-2, 22, 24
26 ⊥
27 N(φ ∧ ψ) ¬I, 3–26
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The upshot is that agglomeration holds on Stalnaker’s theory given a fairly
plausible assumption about “can”. This shouldn’t be too surprising because the
conditional excluded middle holds on Stalnaker’s view, so that C1 and C2 aren’t
both false.
“So much worse for Stalnaker’s theory!”, one might reply. Well, indeed, if
Stalnaker’s view counts C1 and C2 as true, then we might have a problem. But
Stalnaker’s theory doesn’t count C1 and C2 as true. He counts them as neither
true nor false.
This time someone ran off with the coin before it was tossed. Having no
other coin, Tweedledee and Tweedledum argue about how it would have
landed if it had been flipped. Tweedledee is convinced that it would have
landed heads, Tweedledum that it would have landed tails. Again, neither
has a reason – they agree that the coin was a normal one and that the
toss would have been fair. This time, there is little inclination to say that
one of them must be right. Unless there is a story to be told about a fact
that renders one or the other of the counterfactuals true, we will say that
neither is. (Stalnaker 1984: 165)
What Stalnaker does is to combine his account with the theory of superval-
uations (Stalnaker 1980: 90). This is why he takes the truth-values of these
counterfactuals to be indeterminate, that is, neither true nor false. In other
words, Stalnaker’s theory also produces the desired result that C1 and C2 are
not true. But rather than saying they are false, he takes their truth-value as
indeterminate.
On the standard account of supervaluationism, a sentence is true if it is true
on all precisifications, false if it is false on all precisifications, and neither true
nor false otherwise. C1 and C2 are neither true nor false on all precisifications.
10
Thus they are neither true nor false. If truth is truth on all precisifications
then supervaluationists account for validity in the following way: an argument
is globally valid if and only if if the premises are true on all precisifications
the conclusion is true on all precisifications. Since on Stalnaker’s theory the
premises of agglomeration are not true on all precisifications, we cannot say
agglomeration is invalid. So, if we are sympathetic to Stalnaker’s theory, we
cannot assume that the counterexample is successful. The counterexample does
not show a situation in which the premises are true and the conclusion false.
It shows instead a situation in which the premises are indeterminate and the
conclusion is false.
This result is totally in line with the premises of McKay and Johnson’s coun-
terexample being indeterminate rather than true, so that there is no situation in
which the premises of agglomeration are true and the conclusion is false. But if
agglomeration holds, then one need not be worried about McKay and Johnson’s
argument after all. In fact, the second interesting result is that the original rule
(β) holds on Stalnaker’s theory.
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1 Nφ
2 N(φ ⊃ ψ)
3 φ ∧ ∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α) ∧ (Does(x, α) ∼φ)] def. N, 1
4 (φ ⊃ ψ) ∧ ∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α) ∧ (Does(x, α) ∼(φ ⊃ ψ))] def. N, 2
5 φ ∧E, 3
6 φ ⊃ ψ ∧E, 4
7 ψ ⇒E, 5, 6
8 Can(s, a) ∧ (Does(s, a) ∼ψ)
9 Can(s, a) ∧E, 8
10 Does(s, a) ∼ψ ∧E, 8
11 ◇Does(s, a) Can, 9
12 ∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α) ∧ (Does(x, α) ∼φ)] ∧E, 3
13 ∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α) ∧ (Does(x, α) ∼(φ ⊃ ψ))] ∧E, 4
14 ∀x∀α∼[Can(x, α) ∧ (Does(x, α) ∼φ)] Taut con, 12
15 ∼Can(s, a) ∨ ∼(Does(s, a) ∼φ) ∀E, 14
16 ∼Can(s, a) ∨ ∼(Does(s, a) ∼(φ ⊃ ψ) ∀E, 13
17 ∼(Does(s, a) ∼φ) DS, 9, 15
18 ∼(Does(s, a) ∼(φ ⊃ ψ) DS, 9, 16
19 Does(s, a) φ S, 17
20 Does(s, a) (φ ⊃ ψ) S, 18
21 Does(s, a) ψ Taut con, 19, 20
22 ∼(Does(s, a) ψ) S-2, 10, 11
23 ⊥
24 ∼[Can(s, a) ∧ (Does(s, a) ∼ψ)] ¬I, 8–23
25 ∀x∀α∼[Can(s, a) ∧ (Does(s, a) ∼ψ)] ∀I, 24
26 ψ ∧∀x∀α∼[Can(s, a) ∧ (Does(s, a) ∼ψ)] ∧I, 7, 26
27 Nψ def. N, 26
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Stalnaker gives a theory of counterfactuals that differs over details. But
the details matter because they are about how we should express the negation
of a counterfactual conditional. If the negation of a counterfactual φ ψ is
φ ∼ψ, and ∼(φ ψ) is also a negation of the former, then φ ∼ψ is
equivalent to ∼(φ ψ). For conditionals with possibly true antecedents, this
is equivalent to the conditional excluded middle: (φ ψ) ∨ (φ ∼ψ). So
the proof really depends only on the conditional excluded middle principle, as
it relies on the deductive rules (S) and (S-2). It is an important detail after all,
since it affects the validity of the main argument for incompatibilism.
So far, so good. But now one may fairly ask: how relevant is this result in
the context of the current debate concerning the consequence argument? The
simplest answer would be to accept Definition 2.1 and the limit assumption and
run the consequence argument with the N operator. Yet this might not be
something that the incompatibilist advocates of the argument would be happy
to accept, since they would rather not take a stand on counterfactuals. Instead,
they would appeal to a revision of the argument in order to put forward a
version of the consequence argument which is valid regardless of controversial
assumptions about counterfactuals, such as the conditional excluded middle.
However, I shall argue that this move has a cost. The cost is that there is some
particular line of argument against the premises of the revised versions of the
consequence argument that does not succeed against the original version.
4 Revising the consequence argument
One important incompatibilist response to McKay and Johnson’s counterexam-
ple to (β) is to accept the counterexample and adopt a different meaning of
“no-choice about” in terms of the might-counterfactual (O’Connor 2000; Carl-
son 2000; Huemer 2000; Pettit 2002; Turner 2009; and Steward 2012). That
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is, even though there is nothing I can do such that, if I were to do it, the coin
would land heads (tails), there is something I can do such that, if I were to do
it, the coin might land heads (tails).
We can thus introduce the following operator:
Definition 4.1. Mφ if and only if φ ∧ ∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α) ∧ (Does(x, α) ◇→
∼φ)]
The solution then is to run the consequence argument using the M operator,
which is linked to abilities and might-counterfactuals in the way that the N op-
erator is linked to abilities and counterfactuals. Accordingly, the corresponding
(β)-rule will not be open to McKay & Johnson’s counterexample (Carlson 2000:
286–87):
(β-M): Mφ, M(φ ⊃ ψ) ⊢Mψ
This yields, to be sure, a valid formulation of the consequence argument,
regardless of whether or not we accept the limit assumption.
Notice that the premises will now have to be formulated with M. ML, for
example, says that no one can do anything such that L might be false, which
is different from saying that L would be false. How different? That depends on
how we understand the might-counterfactual. While we can all agree that “If
someone tossed the coin, it might have come down heads” and “If someone tossed
the coin, it might have come down tails” are both true, there is an important
dispute among counterfactual theorists over why the might-counterfactual is
true. Why is it true that “If someone tossed the coin, it might have come down
heads (tails)”?
At a first glance, one could say, following Lewis, that P ◇→ Q is true just
because ∼(P  ∼Q) is.3 But many counterfactual theorists find this trou-
blesome because it treats “if... might” as if it were an idiom, as Bennett says,
3Of course, Stalnaker (1981) would demur. On his approach might-counterfactuals are
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“something to be understood as a single linguistic lump, like ‘under way’: you
wouldn’t try to explain ‘At 5 p.m. the ship got under way’ by explaining ‘under’
and explaining ‘way” ’ (2003: 189). The alternative and shared view is that the
might-counterfactual could be analysed in terms of the separate meanings of
“if” and “might” (Stalnaker 1981; Bennett 2003; Gillies 2010; Williams 2010).
Moreover, theM-version of the consequence argument should go through for any
plausible account of might-counterfactuals, or at least for any account which ac-
commodates McKay & Johnson’s counterexample, and should not take a stand
on a specific view such as Lewis’ and his idiomatic treatment of “if... might...”.
That again would force the incompatibilist to take a stand on counterfactuals.
But now consider the view that a might-counterfactual is a counterfactual
with a modal operator expressed by “might” as ⧫ embedded in its consequent,
so that the logical form of the might-counterfactual is P  ⧫Q (Bennett 2003;
Gillies 2010; Goldstein 2020).4 How ⧫ is understood is a matter of controversy5,
but Bennett’s view – which is line with McKay & Johnson’s counterexample –
is that ⧫P means that P is compatible with knowledge of all the present facts.
To get a gist of it let us have a look at our paradigm case. Let T be “the
coin is tossed” and H “the coin lands heads”. The sense in which T  ⧫H
is true is the sense in which even if we had complete knowledge of everything
analysed as an epistemic possibility claim at wide scope to a subjunctive conditional, such as
◇e(P  Q), where ◇e stands for epistemic possibility. Lewis objects to this view (Lewis
1973: 80), but see De Rose (1994) for an intricate response.
4Another proposal is that ⧫ has wide scope, so that the logical form of the might-
counterfactual is ⧫(P  Q). This is the view of Stalnaker (1981) and De Rose (1991),
but since they both accept the conditional excluded middle, the consequence argument could
be ran with N on their approach.
5The dominant view as to “might” is that it expresses some sort of epistemic possibility,
something (not quite but) along these lines: “might P” is true (as uttered by x) iff P is
compatible with what x knows (Williams 2010: 655); De Rose’s view (1991) is that “might P ”
is only true when we do not know nor could in relevant ways find out anything incompatible
with P . Interestingly, if anything along these lines is correct, it does not matter what the
scope of ⧫ is, for ML and MP0 will be too difficult for the incompatibilist to defend. For
instance, ML could be objected by simply pointing out that ∼L is consistent with everything
we know or that the conditional “If I were to do otherwise, ∼L” is consistent with everything
we know. This seems quite plausible because surely the incompatibilist will not want to be
committed to the claim that “might ∼L” is false according to the epistemic “might”.
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that is true by the time T is true, that would not be sufficient for determining
whether H is true (because the process is, say, indeterministic). In other words,
H is compatible with what an ideal agent knows by the time the coin is tossed,
which includes a complete list of everything that is true just before H is true.
Or: Nothing is the case that rules H out (2003: 190).
Of course, given this account, anyone attracted to a Humean view of the laws
will find little reason to accept ML. This sort of objection is well known in the
literature (Beebee 2000, 2003; Gustaffson 2017), but there are some novel points
worth making. Let us first draw a picture of the objection in order to facilitate
discussion. Suppose we have a list of everything that is true in our universe up
to now. According to Humeans, such a list would not display the laws of nature
because the laws are not present in the current state of the universe. So not even
an ideal knower could know whether L is true, even if she knew everything that
is true about the present. The ideal knower would know, to be sure, everything
about the current state of our universe, including true generalisations about
what has happened; but the current state of the universe per se would not, as
it were, contain the laws of nature. As a result, it is trivial that any action one
is able to perform is such that L might not be the case, where “might” stands
for Bennett’s understanding of the diamond.
Does the trivial objection hinge on Bennett’s view? No. Gustaffson puts
forward the Humean objection toML based on the intuitiveness of the following
principle: “if it’s still contingent shortly after P is made true whether ∼Q will
be made true, then the ‘might’ counterfactual ‘If it were the case that P , it
might be the case that ∼Q’ is true, even if P and Q are true (2017: 710). Finch
& Warfield (1998) also make use of a similar intuition by arguing that, in cases
of indeterministic causation where the fact that DB indeterministically causes
the fact that R, “any action (including inaction) at all that one performed is
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such that it might have resulted in R’s not following DB” (1998: 526). But
Bennett’s view seems to nicely accommodate these intuitions.
It could be objected that while the Humean view of the laws gives reason
for denying ML, it also gives reason for denying NL. Influential compatibilists
such as Beebee, for instance, deny both ML and NL.6
Yet it is important to point out that Beebee does not deny NL based on
the trivial objection as above. Beebee argues against NL based on the standard
best system account of the laws (BSA) – according to which the laws of nature
are those generalisations that best combine simplicity and strength – and a
Humean ontology. Beebee is correct, I think, in saying that if we accept the
standard BSA and the Humean picture when it comes to fundamental ontology,
then there seems to be little reason to accept NL. But this is mainly because,
back in the day, the standard BSA, in and of itself, did not have the resources to
account for L’s counterfactual resilience. If the laws are just efficient summaries
of particular matters of fact, and the facts are void of modality, it seems obvious
that if the facts were different, so would be the laws. This makes room for free
will, but at the cost of giving up certain intuitions concerning the laws of nature.
In particular, the intuition that L would still be true if the particular matters
of fact were different. Consider what Demarest (2017) calls the “impoverished
worlds objection”.
Let L stand for “all massive particles attract each other”. Since L is a law
of nature, as philosophers, we might well wonder whether L would still be a
6Vihvelin (2013) is another influential compatibilist who denies NL. But she denies NL
because she thinks – incorrectly in my view – that Lewis’ theory of counterfactuals is enough
to deny NL, regardless of whether or not we accept a Humean view of the laws (2013: 163).
I agree that if Lewis’ theory of counterfactuals is correct, then NL is false. But his theory
clearly hinges on a Humean view of the laws. One distinctive feature of the governing theories
is that the laws are counterfactually resilient, that is, the laws of nature would still be true
in counterfactual suppositions logically consistent with them. This “Nomic Preservation”
principle or something like it is accepted by mainstream governing views of the laws and is
inconsistent with the denial of NL. See, for instance, Lange (2000, 2009), Maudlin (2007),
Goodman (1983), Carroll (1994), and Roberts (2008).
17
law if there was a world with only one massive particle travelling inertially in
perpetuity. Intuitively, or so the objector says, L would still be a law in that
world; because it seems that if there were another particle there, they would
attract each other. However, according to the standard BSA, L would not be
a law. If there is a possible world with just one massive particle travelling
inertially, then it will be a law that “all massive particles travel inertially”. It
intuitively delivers the wrong result.
Humeans have replied to the objection in a number of ways7, but it seems
as though the Humean view of the laws is at odds with our pre-theoretical
intuitions concerning the laws and counterfactuals. So it does not come as a
surprise that NL can also be denied if such a view is assumed.
Nevertheless, thanks to some recent developments of the best system ac-
counts, we need neither accept a Humean ontology nor the standard BSA to
run the trivial objection to ML. I have in mind some contemporary devel-
opments in the laws of nature literature, such as the potency-BSA (Demarest
2017) and the best predictive system account of the laws (Dorst 2018). Both
views can account for L’s counterfactual resilience, namely, that L would still
be true in counterfactual assumptions consistent with it.8 On these views, the
trivial objection to ML will not affect NL, for even though L may be false
relative to idealised epistemic possibility (because knowledge of all the present
facts may not be enough to know what the laws are), the laws will still support
their counterfactuals, so that L will not be false in the closest worlds to ours.
Demarest promotes a scientific package that is Humean when it comes to
the laws of nature but anti-Humean concerning the fundamental properties;
namely, dispositional essentialism, the view that at least some properties at the
7Carroll (1994) offers another version of that argument, which is interestingly responded
by Beebee (2000).
8See, for instance, Dorst (2020) with respect to the predictive BSA and Demarest (2017)
with respect to the potency BSA.
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fundamental level are potencies, that is, properties with dispositional essences
(Ellis 2001; Bird 2007; Jacobs 2010; Tugby 2013). The dispositionalist will
tell us, say, that anything with the dispositional property of positive charge is
essentially disposed (or has the power) to attract negative charges and repel
positive charges. On Demarest’s view, the laws are those axioms that best
systematise all of the possible distributions of the fundamental dispositional
properties. Here is how she deals with the impoverished worlds objection:
Consider, again, a world with a single massive particle, traveling inertially
for all time. The laws of this world will systematize not just this world,
but all worlds that contain mass. Therefore, it will be a law that all
massive particles attract each other, and NOT that they always travel
inertially. (2017: 51).
The view then allegedly accommodates L’s counterfactual resilience. Still,
there is no guarantee – nor should there be – that ∼⧫∼L. Even assuming we
have complete knowledge of the present state of the universe, that may not be
enough to identify every possible distribution of the potencies. The core doctrine
of dispositional essentialism is that the powers of a property are essential to it; it
does not claim anything about when all the properties can come to be distributed
and instantiated in our world.9
All of this was to point out that compatibilists can be more concessive than
Beebee and agree with incompatibilists that the laws of nature would not have
been false had someone acted otherwise. Perhaps most incompatibilist were not
that worried about the standard Humean objection to NL because it presup-
posed some sort of revisionist view of the laws. After all, on Beebee’s view the
laws of nature are not counterfactually resilient with respect to human actions.
9What is more, Tugby (2016) interestingly argues that it is far from clear how dispositional
essentialists can explain that our world is regular rather than chaotic from moment to moment.
An ideal knower could know a great deal of regularities up to now, but then if our world starts
to be chaotic, the axioms of our best system will be altogether different from those regularities.
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But as far as I can see, compatibilists may concede that NL is true without
conceding that ML is true too. The upshot is that we have a particular line
of argument against the M-version of the consequence argument that does not
succeed against the N-version.
Interestingly, the very same line of objection will also affect another influen-
tial incompatibilist line of response to McKay & Johnson. According to this sort
of response, the incompatibilist need not worry about defending ML because
she can put forward the consequence argument with a different rule, such as
(β − 2): Nφ, □(φ ⊃ ψ) ⊢ Nψ.
(β−2) was originally proposed by David Widerker (1987) and then defended
by Alicia Finch & Ted Warfield (1998). More recently, Alexander Pruss (2013)
has proved that (β − 2) holds given the weakening principle about counterfac-
tuals, which holds both on Lewis’ and Stalnaker’s theories. With (β − 2), the
incompatibilist may put forward a new version of the consequence argument:
1 □((L ∧ P0) ⊃ P ) determinism
2 N(L ∧ P0) premise
3 NP β − 2, 1, 2
Even so, the (β − 2) version of the consequence argument is not without
problems. As Warfield & Finch point out (1998: 523), N(L ∧ P0) is formally
stronger than the premises NL and NP0. Even if the original premises were
true, that alone would not be enough to conclude that N(P0&L) is true too,
since the lesson of McKay & Johnson’s argument – if it has any bite – is that N
is not agglomerative. So the opponent of the consequence argument may now
fairly ask why she should accept a premise that is formally stronger than those
in the original version.
In light with this conundrum, Warfield & Finch offer an original defence of
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N(L∧P0). As they put it, L∧P0 “offers a description of what might be called
the “broad past” – the complete state of the world at a time in the distant past
including the laws of nature” (1998: 523). If the broad past is fixed in the way
that the remote past is fixed, then it seems premise 2 is true. But why should
we think that the broad past is fixed? According to the authors:
We think that the claims that the laws are inalterable and do not change
combined with the point that this implies that they are, in a sense, a part
of the past, is a plausible explanation of this intuition about their fixity
(1998: 523, footnote 15).
What is there to say in response? Finch & Warfield talks as though the
laws of nature were necessitation relations among universals (Armstrong 1983;
Dretske 1977; Tooley 1987), so that the laws would already be present in the
distant past. Clearly, however, such a defence of premise 2 does not hold water
according to systematising accounts of the laws, such as those discussed before.
This is because the laws will not be part of the past, and on these views there
is no broad past to get the incompatibilist argument off the ground. Given this
much, the only available defence of premise 2 is quite unpersuasive for a wide
range of contemporary systematising theories of the laws.10 N(L ∧ P0) is left
undefended.
10I regret that I do not know whether systematising views can or should account for the
counterfactual resilience of the broad past; plausibly there is no broad past on systematising
views. Should the broad past be fixed in the impoverished worlds scenario? If it is a law that
all massive particles attract each other in that world, and the broad past is fixed, then the
counterfactual “if there were two particles, they would attract each other” is a counterpossible;
but then it would also be true that “if there were two particles, they would not attract each
other”. But it does not seem Demarest would count them as counterpossibles. Perhaps what
is really a threat to free will on a view such as Demarest is not the deterministic laws, but
the causal powers of the fundamental properties.
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5 Final remarks
All in all, the revised formulations of the consequence argument are not without
problems. This is not to say that they are not important, for they do the nice job
of avoiding McKay & Johnson’s objection to the consequence argument. In this
sense, they are just fine, because they do indeed show that there are seemingly
valid formulations of the consequence argument.11 But if the incompatibilist
wants to get rid of Humean criticisms, adopting the revised versions is not the
way to go. This is why the approach proposed in this paper is important,
for we can maintain the original deduction rules and the original premises of
the consequence argument while avoiding the Humean criticism.12 Of course,
this move has significant costs as well (e.g. Stalnaker’s view of counterfactuals,
supervaluationism, the assumption about “can”, etc.). But as a reviewer pointed
out, perhaps we need not be forced to choose between the standard revisions
of the consequence argument and the approach that makes use of a particular
theory of counterfactuals. It might just be that different approaches are more
successful in some aspects but less successful in other aspects.
To sum up: I have argued that there are two important lessons of McKay &
Johnson’s objection that have been overlooked in the literature. The first is that
the objection presupposes the falsity of the conditional excluded middle, so that
11That is, provided we assume the counterfactual sufficiency interpretation of the N op-
erator, which may be properly challenged. See, for instance, Lampert and Merlussi (2021,
forthcoming).
12Moreover, as an anonymous reviewer pointed out, we are also able to preserve the similar-
ities between the Mind argument and the consequence argument. For example, if we interpret
the relevant counterfactuals in terms of Stalnaker’s theory, we could run the Mind argument
with the N operator. This might be useful if someone wants to defend the view that free
will is metaphysically impossible (because Np would be incompatible with determinism and
indeterminism) or perhaps van Inwagen’s mysterianism. My worry, however, is that the coun-
terfactual interpretation of N may fail to properly capture the control condition related to
free will. See, for instance, Lampert and Merlussi (2021, forthcoming) for arguments against
the counterfactual sufficiency interpretation of N. In fact, the arguments from Lampert and
Merlussi, if successful, would affect any common formulation of the consequence argument
using either of (α), (β), or (β − 2), regardless of whether counterfactuals are interpreted with
a Lewisian or an alternative, Stalnakerian semantics.
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the counterexample to rule (β) is not as robust as we used to think. In order to
make this point I demonstrated that the original rule is valid on a different, well
motivated theory of counterfactuals; Stalnaker’s theory. Second, the revised
versions of the consequence argument are threatened by recent systematising
views of the laws, but these views do not threaten the approach proposed in
this paper.
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